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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be
regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that
the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate
is larger than zero. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy
convexity. Three kinds of special fuzzy cores in games with fuzzy coalition are studied, and
the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given. Because the fuzzy Shapley
value had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between
fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley function is also shown. Surprisingly, the relationship
between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value does coincide, as in the classical case.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The general question raised by any cooperative game can be described as follows: how should the utility set available to
all coalitions be used to determine an outcome from the set of feasible solutions? Most researchers who have investigated
the solutions of cooperative games focus their attention on crisp coalition.
There are some situations inwhich some players do not fully take part in a coalition, but do to a certain extent. A coalition
in which some players participate partially can be treated as a so-called fuzzy coalition introduced in [1,2]. Butnariu [3–5]
defined a Shapley value and showed the explicit form of the Shapley function on a limited class of fuzzy games. Tsurumi
et al. [6] defined new Shapley axioms and a new class of fuzzy games with Choquet integral form. This class of fuzzy games
is both monotone nondecreasing and continuous with respect to players’ participation. The core for fuzzy games is also
studied in [7]. The lexicographical solution for fuzzy games is researched in [8].
The purpose of this paper is to study fuzzy cores for games with fuzzy coalitions. Note that the fuzzy core is different
from core for fuzzy games defined by Tijs et al. [7]. The fuzzy core in this paper coincides with the fuzzy imputation defined
for any fuzzy coalition. In other words, we consider how to allocate the total worth of a fuzzy coalition to the players whose
participation rate is larger than zero.
The paper will be organized as follows: In Section 2, we review some definitions of the crisp cooperative game, such as
the core, the Shapley value, and the imputation. Also, three kinds of games with fuzzy coalitions and their fuzzy Shapley
values are reviewed. In Section 3, we define the fuzzy core of fuzzy games and study the nonempty condition of the fuzzy
core. In Section 4, special attention is paid to three kinds of games with fuzzy coalitions and their relationship with fuzzy
Shapley values. We also analyze the relationship between the fuzzy core and the corresponding core of crisp game.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Crisp cooperative game and its solutions
We consider cooperative games with the set of players N = {1, . . . , n}. A crisp coalition S is a subset of N , and the class
of all crisp coalitions of S is denoted by P(S). Then a crisp cooperative game is defined by (N, v), in which N is the set of
players and the characteristic function v : P(N)→ R+ = {r ∈ R|r ≥ 0} satisfies that v(∅) = 0.
If S and T are disjoint crisp coalitions, it is clear that they can accomplish at least asmuch by joining forces as by remaining
separate. Hence, we mainly discuss the supperadditive crisp cooperative games in this paper, i.e.
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S)+ v(T ), ∀S, T ∈ P(N), s.t. S ∩ T = ∅,
and we denote by Go(N) all the supperadditve crisp cooperative games.
Also, the convexity and the imputation of crisp games are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A crisp cooperative game (N, v) is said to be convex when
v(S ∪ T )+ v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S)+ v(T ), ∀S, T ∈ P(N).
Definition 2.2. An imputation for a crisp cooperative game v ∈ G0(N) is a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) satisfying
(1)
∑
i∈N xi = v(N),
(2) xi ≥ v({i}),∀i ∈ N .
We shall use the notation E(v)(N) for the set of all imputations of the crisp game v ∈ G0(N).
We have many methods to obtain imputations for crisp games, such as the core and Shapley value. The core of a game
v ∈ G0(N) is the convex set
C(v)(N) =
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for each S ∈ P(N)
}
, (1)
which is the set of all undominated imputations for a game v ∈ G0(N). Also, the Shapley value Shi(v) of player iwith respect
to a game v ∈ G0(N) is a weighted average value of the marginal contribution v(S) − v(S \ {i}) of player i alone in all
combinations, which is defined by
Shi(v) =
∑
i∈S∈P(N)
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n! [v(S)− v(S \ {i})], (2)
where n, s are the cardinality of N , S, i.e., n = |N|, s = |S|.
Eq. (2) is the unique expression that satisfies three axiomatic characterization of Shapley value [9].
Lemma 2.1. Let v ∈ G0(N) be convex game. Then
Sh(v) = (Sh1(v), . . . , Shn(v)) ∈ C(v).
Note any subset T of N can be seen as the grand coalition relative to the S ⊆ T . Hence, we define the T-restricted game of
v ∈ G0(N) as follows.
Definition 2.3. Let v ∈ G0(N),T ∈ P(N) and T 6= ∅. Then the T -restricted game of v is a game (T , vT )where vT (S) = v(S)
for all S ⊆ T . The game (T , vT )will also be denoted by (T , v).
Then the above definitions about crisp games are not only applicable to allocate v(N) but also available to allocate
T -restricted game of (N, v). In other words, we can also allocate the worth of every coalitionT ⊆ N . In this paper, we
denote the imputation {x}i∈T for game (T , vT ) by n dimensional vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)with
xi = 0 if i ∈ N \ T .
In other word, we assume the payoff of ith player in game (T , vT ) is zero if i does not belong to T . For the convenience of
depiction, we often denote the crisp core C(v)(N) by C(v) and C(vT )(T ) by C(vT ).
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2.2. Game with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy Shapley value
A fuzzy coalition U is a fuzzy subset of N , which is a vector U = {U(1), . . . ,U(n)}with coordinates U(i) contained in the
interval [0,1]. The number U(i) describes the membership grade of i in U . For two fuzzy coalitions K and U , K ⊆ Umeans
thatK(i) ≤ U(i), ∀i ∈ N . The class of all fuzzy subsets of U is denoted by F(U). For a fuzzy set U , the α-level set is defined as
[U]α = {i ∈ N|U(i) ≥ α} for any α ∈ [0, 1], and the support set is denoted by Supp(U) = {i ∈ N|U(i) > 0}.
A cooperative game with fuzzy coalition is a pair (N, v) in which the function v : F(N)→ R+ is such that v(∅) = 0.
In this paper,we adopt the usual definition of union and intersection of fuzzy subset given by themaximumandminimum
operators, i.e.
(K ∪ U)(i) = max{K(i),U(i)}, ∀i ∈ N,
(K ∩ U)(i) = min{K(i),U(i)}, ∀i ∈ N.
Corresponding to the crisp cooperative games,wemainly discuss the supperaddtive gameswith fuzzy coalition in this paper,
i.e.
v(K ∪ U) ≥ v(U)+ v(K), ∀U, K ∈ F(N), s.t. U ∩ K = ∅,
and we denote by GF (N) all the supperadditve games with fuzzy coalition.
Following [6], the extended convexity for games with fuzzy coalition is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. A fuzzy game v ∈ GF (N) is said to be convex when
v(K ∪ U)+ v(K ∩ U) ≥ v(K)+ v(U), ∀U, K ∈ F(N).
Now we extend imputation to fuzzy imputation so that it will be available for games with fuzzy coalitions. Preparatory to
its definition, let us define SU ∈ F(U) by
SU(i) =
{
U(i), if i ∈ S,
0, otherwise,
for any U ∈ F(N) and S ⊆ N . We often write iU instead of {i}U , where i ∈ N .
Definition 2.5. A function x : F(U)→ Rn+ is said to be imputation for a fuzzy game v ∈ GF (N) in fuzzy coalition U ∈ F(N)
if
(1) xi(U) = 0,∀i 6∈ Supp(U),
(2)
∑
i∈N xi(U) = v(U),
(3) xi(U) ≥ v(iU),∀i ∈ Supp(U),
where x(U) = (x1(U), . . . , xn(U)).
We shall use the notation E˜(v)(U) for the set of all imputations of the fuzzy game v ∈ GF (N) in fuzzy coalition U ∈ F(N).
Note that the definition above is also applicable to crisp games by restricting the domain. Butnariu [4] and Tsurumi
et al. [6] have proposed the imputation too, but the two kinds of definitions are different from Definition 2.5.
In general, it is difficult to identify a characteristic function of a game with fuzzy coalitions in practice. Hence, a fuzzy
characteristic function is often constructed on the basis of the characteristic function of the original crisp game when a
decision maker tries to incorporate fuzzy coalitions in a model. Extending the crisp game to the game with fuzzy coalition
can be represented by a mapping from the characteristic function of the crisp game to that of the game fuzzy coalition, such
as the Owen’s extension [10], Butnariu’s extension [4] and the Tsurumi et al.’s extension [6].
Let v ∈ G0(N),U ∈ F(N), Q (U) = {U(i)|U(i) > 0, i ∈ N}, q(U) be the cardinality of Q (U), i.e. q(U) = |Q (U)|, and
rm(U) = {i|i ∈ N,U(i) = rm}. The element in Q (U) are written in the increasing order as r1 < · · · < rq(U), and let r0 = 0.
Then the Owen’s extension ov ∈ GF (N), Butnariu’s extension bv ∈ GF (N) and the Tsurumi et al.’s extension tv ∈ GF (N) are
defined as follows.
ov(U) =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i)
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T ), (3)
bv(U) =
q(U)∑
m=1
v(rm(U)) · rm, (4)
tv(U) =
q(U)∑
m=1
v([U]rm) · (rm − rm−1). (5)
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Note that the Owen’s extension is also called multilinear extension, the games defined by Butnariu in Eq. (4) are
also named games with proportional value, and the games defined by Tsurumi et al. in Eq. (5) are also the games with
choquet integral form. There is a one-to-one correspondence between a crisp game and a fuzzy game ov, bv, tv ∈ GF (N),
respectively. We call the crisp game corresponding to fuzzy game ov, bv, tv ∈ GF (N) the associated crisp game.
In order to get the imputations for games with fuzzy coalitions, Butnariu and Tsurumi et al. have given the fuzzy Shapley
value f (bv) and f (tv) as the solution for bv ∈ GF (N) and tv ∈ GF (N),
fi(bv)(U) =
{
shi(vrm(U)) · U(i), if i ∈ rm(U), rm ∈ Q (U),
0, otherwise, (6)
fi(tv)(U) =
q(U)∑
m=1
shi(v[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1), (7)
where vrm(U) is rm(U)-restricted game of v, shi(vrm(U)) is the crisp Shapley value for player i ∈ N in game vrm(U), and v[U]rm
is [U]rm-restricted game game of v, and shi(v[U]rm ) is the crisp Shapley value for player i ∈ N in game v[U]rm .
3. The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions
In this section, we will give another solution for games with fuzzy coalitions, i.e., the fuzzy core. Firstly, we extend the
core of crisp game as the imputations for game with fuzzy coalitions.
Definition 3.1. Let U ∈ F(N). The fuzzy core of a game v ∈ GF (N) in fuzzy coalition U is the convex set C˜(v)(U), i.e.,
C˜(v)(U) =
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi = v(U),
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi ≥ v(SU) for each S ∈ P(N)
}
. (8)
We define an excess of a fuzzy coalition as well as that of a crisp coalition. Let U ∈ F(N), S ∈ P(N) and x = (x1, . . . , xn)
be an imputation for U . Then an excess of the fuzzy coalition SU with respect to the payoff vector x is denoted by
e˜(S, x) = v(SU)−
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi. (9)
Thus, the fuzzy core of a game v ∈ GF (N) in fuzzy coalitionU can also been thought as the set of all imputation x satisfying
that all the excess function are not positive, i.e.,
C˜(v)(U) = {x ∈ E˜(v)(U)|˜e(S, x) ≤ 0 for each S ∈ P(N)} . (10)
As special cases of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions, crisp cooperative games have the excess of S ∈ P(N),
e(S, x) = v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi, (11)
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an imputation of v ∈ G0(N).
Hence, the core of a game v ∈ Go(N) can also be represented by
C(v)(N) = {x ∈ E(v)(N)|e(S, x) ≤ 0 for each S ∈ P(N)} . (12)
It is not hard to see that the fuzzy core for fuzzy game v ∈ GF (N) in Eq. (10) is generalized form of core for crisp game
v ∈ G0(N) in Eq. (12). The fuzzy core may be an empty set just as the core for the crisp games. Therefore, it is necessary to
find the condition that the fuzzy core is nonempty.
Lemma 3.1. A game v ∈ GF (N) is convex, then for all i ∈ N and any U ∈ F(N),
v(SU ∪ iU)− v(SU) ≤ v(TU ∪ iU)− v(TU) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i}.
Proof. If S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i}, then (S ∪ i)U ∩ TU = SU and (S ∪ i)U ∪ TU = TU ∪ iU . Due to the convexity of v ∈ GF (N), we have
v(TU ∪ iU)+ v(SU) ≥ v(S ∪ iU)+ v(TU). 
Theorem 3.1. Let fuzzy game v ∈ GF (N) and any fuzzy coalition U ∈ F(N). If v is convex, then C˜(v)(U) 6= ∅.
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Proof. Let the set of players be N = {1, . . . , n}, and pi be a permutation of N . Then we denote by
Ppii = {j ∈ N|pi(j) < pi(i)}
the set of members of N which precede iwith respect to the order pi . Also, we define xpii ∈ R+ by
xpii = v([Ppii ∪ {i}]U)− v([Ppii ]U), ∀i ∈ N. (13)
Next, we will prove thatxpi = (xpi1 , . . . , xpin ) ∈ C˜(v)(U).
Summing up the equalities (13), we obtain
∑
i∈N x
pi
i = v(NU)− v(∅U) = v(U).
Then we have to show
∑
i∈Supp(SU ) x
pi
i ≥ v(SU) for any S ∈ P(N).
Let i1, . . . , i be chosen such that S = {i1, . . . , is} and pi(i1) < pi(i2) < · · · < pi(is), where s = |S|. Hence,
{i1, . . . , ij−1} ⊆ Ppiij for every j = 1, . . . , s. Thus by Lemma 3.1,
v([Ppiij ∪ {ij}]U)− v([Ppiij ]U) ≥ v({i1, . . . , ij}U)− v({i1, . . . , ij−1}U), (14)
for j = 1, . . . , s. Summing up the inequalities (14), we get that∑i∈Supp(SU ) xpii ≥ v(SU).
The proof is completed. 
Example 3.1. Let N = {1, 2}, v be a characteristic function on N as follows,
v(∅) = 0, v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 2, v({1, 2}) = 4. Then Owen ’s multilinear extension is
ov(U) = U(1) · (1− U(2))+ 2U(2) · (1− U(1))+ 4U(1) · U(2),
equivalently,
ov(U) = U(1)+ 2U(2)+ U(1) · U(2).
Obviously, this game ov ∈ GF (N) is convex, so the fuzzy core of the game ov ∈ GF (N) is
C˜o(v)(U) =
{
y ∈ R2+|y1 + y2 = U(1)+ 2U(2)+ U(1) · U(2), y1 ≥ U(1), y2 ≥ 2U(2)
}
.
(1) If U(1) = U(2) = 1, then
C˜o(v)(U) = C(v) =
{
y ∈ R2+|y1 + y2 = 4, y1 ≥ 1, y2 ≥ 2
}
.
(2) If U(1) = 0.2 and U(2) = 0.3, then
C˜o(v)(U) =
{
y ∈ R2+|y1 + y2 = 0.86, y1 ≥ 0.2, y2 ≥ 0.6
}
.
Although the fuzzy core has been defined above, it is not easy to get the fuzzy core by the expression of C˜(v)(U). However,
it is not hard to find the core C(v) for the associated crisp game v ∈ G0(N) because there are many methods can be used.
Hence, it forces us to build the relationship between the fuzzy core and crisp core from the advantage that several solution
concepts in crisp games can be used without modification. In the next section, we will take research on the fuzzy cores for
the game ov, bv, tv ∈ GF (N), respectively.
4. The relation between the fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value
In this section the fuzzy cores for three main kinds of games with fuzzy coalitions ov, bv, tv ∈ GF (N) are given. Also, the
relationship between fuzzy core and fuzzy Shapley value will be studied.
4.1. The fuzzy core for the fuzzy games ov ∈ GF (N) defined by Owen
Let ov ∈ GF (N). The excess e˜o(S, x) of the fuzzy coalition SU with respect to the payoff vector x in ov ∈ GF (N) is
e˜o(S, x) = ov(SU)−
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T )−
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi
then the fuzzy core of ov ∈ GF (N) is represented as
C˜o(v)(U) =
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T ), e˜o(S, x) ≤ 0 for ∀S ∈ P(N)
}
.
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Lemma 4.1. Let ov ∈ GF (N), U ∈ F(N). Then for any S ⊆ N,
ov(SU) =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T ) =
∑
T⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T ).
Proof. Let S, T ⊆ N . If i ∈ T \ Supp(SU), then SU(i) = 0; if i ∈ Supp(SU), then SU(i) = U(i); if i 6∈ Supp(SU), then SU(i) = 0.
Hence, we get∑
T∈P(N)\P(Supp(SU ))
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T )
=
∑
T∈P(N)\P(Supp(SU ))
{ ∏
i∈T∩Supp(SU )
SU(i) ·
∏
i∈T\Supp(SU )
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T ) = 0.
Consequently, the following holds
ov(SU) =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T )
=
∑
T∈P(Supp(SU ))
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T )+
∑
T∈P(N)\P(Supp(SU ))
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T )
=
∑
T∈P(Supp(SU ))
{∏
i∈T
SU(i) ·
∏
i6∈Supp(SU )
(1− SU(i)) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T
(1− SU(i))
}
· v(T )
=
∑
T⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T ). 
Proposition 4.1. Let v ∈ G0(N) be the associated crisp game of ov ∈ GF (N). If all the T-restricted games of v ∈ G0(N) are
convex, then C˜o(v)(U) 6= ∅ and
C˜o(v)(U) =
{
y
∣∣∣∣∣y =∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xT
}
, ∀xT = (xT1, xT2, . . . , xTn) ∈ C(vT ),∀T ⊆ N
}
,
where U ∈ F(N).
Proof. Let C(vT ) 6= ∅ for ∀T ⊆ N . Given any U ∈ F(N) and any xT ∈ C(vT ), let
y ,
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xT
}
.
Firstly, we shall show y ∈ C˜o(v)(U).
Due to xT = (xT1, xT2, . . . , xTn) ∈ C(vT ), we get∑
j∈N
yj =
∑
j∈N
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
}
=
∑
T⊆N
∑
j∈N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
}
=
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) ·
∑
j∈N
xTj
}
=
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · v(T )
}
= ov(U).
The following always holds,∑
j∈Supp(SU )
yj =
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
}
=
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
{ ∑
T⊆N:T∩Supp(SU )=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
}
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+
∑
T⊆N:T∩Supp(SU )6=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
}}
=
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
∑
T⊆N:T∩Supp(SU )6=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i))
}
· xTj
=
∑
T⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) ·
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
xTj
}
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6⊂Supp(SU ),T∩Supp(SU )6=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) ·
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
xTj
}
=
∑
T⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · v(T )
}
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6⊂Supp(SU ),T∩Supp(SU )6=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) ·
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
xTj
}
.
Given any T 6⊂ Supp(SU), let T1 = T ∩ Supp(SU) and T2 = T \ T1. Then T = T1 ∪ T2, T1 ⊆ Supp(SU), T2 ⊆ N \ Supp(SU)
and T1 ∩ T2 = ∅. Thus,∑
T⊆N:T 6⊂Supp(SU ),T∩Supp(SU )6=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) ·
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
xTj
}
≥
∑
T1⊆Supp(SU )
∑
T2⊆N\Supp(SU ):T2 6=∅
{∏
i∈T1
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T1
(1− U(i)) ·
∏
i∈T2
U(i) ·
∏
i∈N\(T2∪Supp(SU ))
(1− U(i)) · v(T1)
}
=
∑
T1⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T1
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T1
(1− U(i)) · v(T1)
∑
T2⊆N\Supp(SU ):T2 6=∅
{∏
i∈T2
U(i) ·
∏
i∈N\(T2∪Supp(SU ))
(1− U(i))
}}
.
Further, we have∑
j∈Supp(SU )
yj =
∑
T⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · v(T )
}
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6⊂Supp(SU ),T∩Supp(SU )6=∅
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) ·
∑
j∈Supp(SU )
xTj
}
≥
∑
T1⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T1
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T1
(1− U(i)) · v(T1)
×
( ∏
i∈N\Supp(SU )
(1− U(i))+
∑
T2⊆N\Supp(SU ):T2 6=∅
∏
i∈T2
U(i) ·
∏
i∈N\(T2∪Supp(SU ))
(1− U(i))
)}
=
∑
T1⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T1
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T1
(1− U(i)) · v(T1)
}
,
where in the last line we have used that∏
i∈N\Supp(SU )
(1− U(i))+
∑
T2⊆N\Supp(SU ):T2 6=∅
∏
i∈T2
U(i) ·
∏
i∈N\(T2∪Supp(SU ))
(1− U(i))
=
∑
T2⊆N\Supp(SU )
∏
i∈T2
U(i) ·
∏
i∈N\(T2∪Supp(SU ))
(1− U(i)) = 1.
By Lemma 4.1, we can get the conclusion that∑
j∈Supp(SU )
yj ≥
∑
T1⊆Supp(SU )
{∏
i∈T1
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(SU )\T1
(1− U(i)) · v(T1)
}
= ov(SU).
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Hence, for ∀U ⊆ F(N), C˜o(v)(U) 6= ∅.
Next, we show that any z ∈ C˜o(v)(U) can be written by
z =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xT
}
. (15)
Let xTj = min
{
xTj |∀xT ∈ C(vT )
}
and xTj = max
{
xTj |∀xT ∈ C(vT )
}
for any T ⊆ N . Obviously,
xTj =
{
v({j}), if j ∈ T ,
0, otherwise, x
T
j =
{
v(T )− v(T \ {j}), if j ∈ T ,
0, otherwise.
If there exists S ⊆ N such that zj can not be written by Eq. (15) for any j ∈ S, then there are only two cases for zj,
(i) zj <
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T (1− U(i)) · xTj ;
(ii) zj >
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T (1− U(i)) · xTj .
Case (i): Because z ∈ C˜o(v)(U), it follows that
zj <
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
=
∑
T⊆N:j∈T
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj +
∑
T⊆N:j6∈T
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
=
∑
T⊆N:j∈T
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · v({j})
= U(j) · v({j}) ·
∑
T⊆N\{j}
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i∈N\(T∪{j})
(1− U(i))
= U(j) · v({j}).
By Lemma 4.1, we have
ov(jU) =
∑
T⊆Supp(jU )
{∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i∈Supp(jU )\T
(1− U(i))
}
· v(T ) =
∏
i∈{j}
jU(i) ·
∏
i6∈{j}
(1− jU(i)) · v({j}) = U(j) · v({j}).
Then
zj < ov(jU),
which contradicts with z ∈ C˜o(v)(U).
Case (ii): If zj >
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T U(i)
∏
i6∈T (1 − U(i))xTj for any j ∈ S, then there must exist nonempty S/ ⊆ N such that
zj <
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T (1 − U(i)) · xTj for any j ∈ S/. In fact, if S/ = ∅, then any j ∈ N \ S can be represented by
xT = (xT1, xT2, . . . , xTn) ∈ C(vT ), i.e.,∑
j∈N
zj >
∑
j∈S
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj +
∑
j∈N\S
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj
≥
∑
j∈N
∑
T⊆N
∏
i∈T
U(i) ·
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xTj = ov(U),
which contradicts with z ∈ C˜o(v)(U). Thus, S/ 6= ∅. By the proof of Case (i), we know that zj <∑T⊆N∏i∈T U(i) ·∏i6∈T (1−
U(i)) · xTj can not hold true, either.
Hence, we get the conclusion that any z ∈ C˜o(v)(U) can be written by
z =
∑
T⊆N
{∏
i∈T
U(i)
∏
i6∈T
(1− U(i)) · xT
}
.
The proof is completed. 
Example 4.1 (Cf. Example 3.1). Let N = {1, 2}, v be a characteristic function on N as defined in Example 3.1, i.e.,
v(∅) = 0, v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 2, v({1, 2}) = 4.
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It is not hard to get the core for the crisp game as follows,
x{1} ∈ C(v{1}) = {(1, 0)}, x{2} ∈ C(v{2}) = {(0, 2)},
x{1,2} ∈ C(v) =
{
x{1,2} ∈ R2+|x{1,2}1 + x{1,2}2 = 4, x{1,2}1 ≥ 1, x{1,2}2 ≥ 2
}
.
Letting
y = U(1) · (1− U(2))x{1} + U(2) · (1− U(1))x{2} + U(1) · U(2)x{1,2},
i.e.,
y = (U(1)+ U(1) · U(2)(x{1,2}1 − 1), 2U(2)+ U(1) · U(2)(x{1,2}2 − 2)).
Hence, the fuzzy core this game ov ∈ GF (N) is
C˜o(v)(U) =
{
y ∈ R2+|y1 + y2 = U(1)+ 2U(2)+ U(1) · U(2), y1 ≥ U(1), y2 ≥ 2U(2)
}
.
Obviously, the fuzzy core coincides with the result in Example 3.1.
4.2. The fuzzy core for the fuzzy games bv ∈ GF (N) by Butnariu
Let bv ∈ GF (N), U ∈ F(N) and Q (U) = {U(i)|U(i) > 0, i ∈ N}, q(U) = |Q (U)|. The element in Q (U) are written in
the increasing order as r1 < · · · < rq(U).The excess e˜b(S, x) of the fuzzy coalition SU with respect to the payoff vector x in
bv ∈ GF (N) is
e˜b(S, x) = bv(SU)−
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi =
q(U)∑
m=1
v(Srm(U)) · rm −
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi,
then the fuzzy core of bv ∈ GF (N) is represented by
C˜b(v)(U) =
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi =
q(U)∑
m=1
v(rm(U)) · rm,
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi ≥
q(U)∑
m=1
v(Srm(U)) · rmfor ∀S ∈ P(N)
}
.
Theorem 4.1. Let v ∈ G0(N) be the associated crisp game of bv ∈ GF (N). Given any U ∈ F(N), if C(vrm(U)) 6= ∅,
m = 1, 2, . . . , q(U), then C˜b(v)(U) 6= ∅ and
C˜b(v)(U) =
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣y =
q(U)∑
m=1
rm · xm =
(
q(U)∑
m=1
rmxm1 ,
q(U)∑
m=1
rmxm2 , . . . ,
q(U)∑
m=1
rmxmn
)
,
∀xm = (xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmn ) ∈ C(vrm(U)), m = 1, 2, . . . , q(U)
 (16)
where rm(U) = {i|i ∈ N,U(i) = rm}.
Proof. Let C(vrm(U)) 6= ∅ form = 1, 2, . . . , q(U). Given any U ∈ F(N) and any xm ∈ C(vrm(U)), let y ,∑q(U)m=1 rm · xm. Firstly,
we show y ∈ C˜b(v)(U).
Due to
∑
i∈N x
m
i = v(rm(U)), we have∑
i∈N
yi =
∑
i∈N
q(U)∑
m=1
rm · xmi =
q(U)∑
m=1
(
rm ·
∑
i∈N
xmi
)
=
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm · v(rm(U))) = bv(U).
If r1 < · · · < rq(U), then∪q(U)m=1 rm(U) = Supp(U) and ri(U)∩rj(U) = ∅when ri 6= rj. In otherwords,
{
r1(U), . . . , rq(U)(U)
}
is a partition of Supp(U). Due to xm ∈ C(vrm(U)), it follows that xmi = 0 for ∀i 6∈ rm(U). Hence,
∑
i∈Supp(SU ) x
m
i =
∑
i∈Srm(U) x
m
i
holds. Further, we obtain
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
yi =
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
q(U)∑
m=1
rm · xmi =
q(U)∑
m=1
(
rm ·
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xmi
)
=
q(U)∑
m=1
rm · ∑
i∈Srm(U)
xmi
 ≥ q(U)∑
m=1
(
rm · v(Srm(U))
)
.
Hence, we obtain y =∑q(U)m=1 rm · xm ∈ C˜b(v)(U) and C˜b(v)(U) 6= ∅.
Given any y ∈ C˜b(v)(U), let
xmi =
{ yi
rm
, if i ∈ rm(U),
0, otherwise,
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m = 1, . . . , q(U). Next we will prove that xm = (xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmn ) ∈ C(vrm(U)). By the definition of fuzzy core, we know∑
i∈Supp([rm(U)]U )
yi ≥ bv([rm(U)]U) = rm · v(rm(U)) and
q(U)∑
m=1
∑
i∈Supp([rm(U)]U )
yi =
n∑
i=1
yi =
q(U)∑
m=1
rm · v(rm(U)).
Hence, we have that∑
i∈Supp([rm(U)]U )
yi = rm · v(rm(U)),
i.e. ∑
i∈Supp([rm(U)]U )
yi
rm
=
∑
i∈rm(U)
yi
rm
= v(rm(U)),
which means
∑
i∈rm(U) x
m
i = v(rm(U)).
On the other hand,
∑
i∈Srm(U) yi ≥ rm · v(Srm(U)) holds, which means∑
i∈Srm(U)
xmi ≥ v(Srm(U)).
So xm ∈ C(vrm(U)). The proof is completed. 
It is apparent that bv ∈ GF (N) is convex if its associated crisp game v ∈ Go(N) is convex. Thus, if the crisp game v ∈ Go(N)
is convex, then the fuzzy core of the game bv ∈ GF (N) defined by Eq. (4) is nonempty.
Theorem 4.2. Let v ∈ G0(N) be convex game bv ∈ GF (N) be the game defined by Eq. (4). Then
{fi(bv)(U)}i∈N ∈ C˜b(v)(U).
Proof. Because fuzzy Shapley is an imputation for game bv ∈ GF (N), it has been proof in Ref. [4] that∑i∈N fi(bv)(U) =
bv(U). Thus, we have to prove that∑
i∈Supp(SU )
fi(bv)(U) ≥
q(U)∑
m=1
v(Srm(U)) · rm.
By Eq. (6),∑
i∈Supp(SU )
fi(bv)(U) =
q(U)∑
m=1
∑
i∈Srm(U)
fi(bv)(U) =
q(U)∑
m=1
∑
i∈Srm(U)
shi(vrm(U)) · rm
≥
q(U)∑
m=1
vrm(U)(Srm(U)) · rm =
q(U)∑
m=1
v(Srm(U)) · rm,
where in the last two lines we use the Lemma 2.1. The proof is completed. 
Example 4.2 (Cf. Example 3.1). Let N = {1, 2}, v be a characteristic function on N as defined in Example 3.1.
Then Butnariu ’s proportional extension is
bv(U) =
{
4U(1), if U(1) = U(2),
U(1)+ 2U(2), otherwise.
In Example 3.1, we have known that
C(v) =
{
x{1,2} ∈ R2+|x{1,2}1 + x{1,2}2 = 4, x{1,2}1 ≥ 1, x{1,2}2 ≥ 2
}
.
(1) If U(1) = U(2), then the fuzzy core of this game bv ∈ GF (N) is
C˜b(v)(U) =
{
(U(1) · x{1,2}1 ,U(1) · x{1,2}2 )|x{1,2}1 + x{1,2}2 = 4, x{1,2}1 ≥ 1, x{1,2}2 ≥ 2
}
.
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The fuzzy Shapley value is
f1(bv)(U) = sh1(v) · U(1) =
[
(4− 2)
2
+ 1
2
]
· U(1) = 3 · U(1)
2
,
f2(bv)(U) = sh2(v) · U(1) =
[
(4− 1)
2
+ 2
2
]
· U(1) = 5 · U(1)
2
.
Obviously, ( 3·U(1)2 ,
5·U(1)
2 ) ∈ C˜b(v)(U).
(2) If U(1) 6= U(2), then
C(v{1}) = {(1, 0)}, C(v{2}) = {(0, 2)}, C˜b(v)(U) = {(U(1), 2U(2))}.
And the fuzzy Shapley value (U(1), 2U(2)) ∈ C˜b(v)(U).
4.3. The fuzzy core for the fuzzy games tv ∈ GF (N) by Tsurumi
Let tv ∈ GF (N). The excess e˜t(S, x) of the fuzzy coalition SU with respect to the payoff vector x in tv ∈ GF (N) is
e˜t(S, x) = tv(SU)−
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi =
q(U)∑
m=1
v(S[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1)−
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi,
then the fuzzy core of tv ∈ GF (N) is represented as
C˜t(v)(U) =
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi =
q(U)∑
m=1
v([U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1),
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xi ≥
q(U)∑
m=1
v(S[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1) for ∀S ∈ P(N)
}
.
Theorem 4.3. Let v ∈ G0(N) be the associated crisp game of tv ∈ GF (N). Given any U ∈ F(N) and Q (U) = {U(i)|U(i) >
0, i ∈ N}, q(U) = |Q (U)|. The element in Q (U) are written in the increasing order as r1 < · · · < rq(U). If Supp(U)-restricted
game of v is convex, then C˜t(v)(U) 6= ∅ and
C˜t(v)(U) =
y|y =
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xm =
(
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1)xm1 , . . . ,
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1)xmn
)
,
∀xm = (xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmn ) ∈ C(v[U]rm ),m = 1, 2, . . . , q(U)
 .
Proof. It is obvious that C(v[U]rm ) 6= ∅ for m = 1, 2, . . . , q(U). Given any U ∈ F(N) and any xm ∈ C(v[U]rm ), let
y ,
∑q(U)
m=1(rm − rm−1) · xm. Firstly, we show y ∈ C˜t(v)(U).
Because xm = (xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmn ) ∈ C(v[U]rm ), we have∑
i∈N
yi =
∑
i∈N
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmi =
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) ·
∑
i∈N
xmi =
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · v([U]rm) = tv(U).
Also, the following holds∑
i∈Supp(SU )
yi =
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmi =
q(U)∑
m=1
{
(rm − rm−1) ·
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
xmi
}
=
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · ∑
i∈S[U]rm
xmi
 ≥ q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · v(S[U]rm ).
Hence, C˜t(v)(U) 6= ∅.
Next, we will show that any z ∈ C˜t(v)(U) can be denoted by
z =
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xm. (17)
For any rm ∈ Q (U), let
xmj , min
{
xmj |xm ∈ C(v[U]rm )
}
, xmj , max
{
xmj |xm ∈ C(v[U]rm )
}
.
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Also let
S ,
{
j ∈ N
∣∣∣∣∣zj > q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj
}
, S/ ,
{
j ∈ N
∣∣∣∣∣zj < q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj
}
.
If there exists j ∈ N such that zj can not be written as Eq. (17). Then there are only two cases for zj,
(i) zj <
∑q(U)
m=1(rm − rm−1) · xmj ;
(ii) zj >
∑q(U)
m=1(rm − rm−1) · xmj .
Case (i): Assume zj <
∑q(U)
m=1(rm − rm−1) · xmj . Because z ∈ C˜t(v)(U), we have
tv(S/U) ≤
∑
j∈Supp(S/U )
zj
i.e.,
tv(S/U) <
∑
j∈Supp(S/U )
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj .
Hence, the following holds:
0 <
∑
j∈Supp(S/U )
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj − tv(S/U)
=
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) ·
∑
j∈Supp(S/U )
xmj
−
q(U)∑
m=1
v(S/[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1)
=
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) ·
 ∑
j∈Supp(S/U )
xmj − v(S/[U]rm )

 .
Thus, there must exist rm ∈ Q (U) such that∑
j∈Supp(S/U )
xmj − v(S/[U]rm ) =
∑
j∈S/[U]rm
xmj − v(S/[U]rm ) =
∑
j∈S/[U]rm
v({j})− v(S/[U]rm ) > 0,
which contradicts with the supperadditivity of tv ∈ GF (N).
Case (ii): Assume zj >
∑q(U)
m=1(rm − rm−1) · xmj . Then S/ 6= ∅. In fact, if S/ = ∅, then any j ∈ N \ S,zj can be represented
by xm = (xm1 , xm2 , . . . , xmn ) ∈ C(v[U]rm ), i.e.,∑
j∈N
zj >
∑
j∈S
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj +
∑
j∈N\S
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj ≥
∑
j∈N
q(U)∑
m=1
(rm − rm−1) · xmj = tv(U),
which contradicts with z ∈ C˜t(v)(U). Thus, S/ 6= ∅. By the proof of Case (i), we know that zj <∑q(U)m=1(rm − rm−1) · xmj can
not hold true, either.
Hence, we get the conclusion that we show that any z ∈ C˜t(v)(U) can be written by Eq. (17). The proof is completed. 
It is apparent that tv ∈ GF (N) is convex if its associated crisp game v ∈ Go(N) is convex. Thus, if the crisp game v ∈ Go(N)
is convex, then the fuzzy core of the game tv ∈ GF (N) defined by Eq. (5) is nonempty.
Proposition 4.2. Let tv ∈ GF (N), U ∈ F(N) and x ∈ C˜t(v)(U). If K ⊆ U, then x also satisfies∑
i∈N
xi ≥ tv(K). (18)
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Proof. Let x ∈ C˜t(v)(U). If K ⊆ U , then by Eq. (5), we get that tv(U) ≥ tv(K).
Due to x ∈ C˜t(v)(U), we can also have∑
i∈N
xi = tv(U) ≥ tv(K).
The proof is completed. 
Theorem 4.4. Let v ∈ G0(N) be convex game, tv ∈ GF (N) be the game defined by (5). Then
{fi(tv)(U)}i∈N ∈ C˜t(v)(U).
Proof. Because fuzzy Shapley is an imputation for game tv ∈ GF (N), we have∑i∈N fi(tv)(U) = tv(U). Thus, we only need
to show that∑
i∈Supp(SU )
fi(tv)(U) ≥
q(U)∑
m=1
v(S[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1).
By Eq. (7), we obtain∑
i∈Supp(SU )
fi(tv)(U) =
∑
i∈Supp(SU )
q(U)∑
m=1
shi(v[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1) =
q(U)∑
m=1
∑
i∈S[U]rm
shi(v[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1)
≥
q(U)∑
m=1
v(S[U]rm ) · (rm − rm−1) = tv(SU).
The proof is completed. 
Example 4.3 (Cf. Example 3.1). Let N = {1, 2}, U(1) = 0.2 and U(2) = 0.3, v be a characteristic function on N as defined
in Example 3.1.
Then Tsurumi et al.’s choquet integral extension is
tv(U) = 0.2 · v({1, 2})+ (0.3− 0.2) · v({2}) = 1.
Because
C(v) =
{
x{1,2} ∈ R2+|x{1,2}1 + x{1,2}2 = 4, x{1,2}1 ≥ 1, x{1,2}2 ≥ 2
}
,
the fuzzy core of this game tv ∈ GF (N) is
C˜t(v)(U) =
{
(0.2x{1,2}1 + 0.1x{2}1 , 0.2x{1,2}2 + 0.1x{2}2 )|x{1,2}1 + x{1,2}2 = 4, x{1,2}1 ≥ 1, x{1,2}2 ≥ 2, x{2}1 = 0, x{2}2 = 2
}
i.e.
C˜t(v)(U) =
{
(0.2x{1,2}1 , 0.2x
{1,2}
2 + 0.2)|x{1,2}1 + x{1,2}2 = 4, x{1,2}1 ≥ 1, x{1,2}2 ≥ 2
}
.
The fuzzy Shapley value is
f1(tv)(U) = sh1(v{1,2}) · 0.2+ sh1(v{2}) · 0.1 = 0.2 ·
[
(4− 2)
2
+ 1
2
]
+ 0 = 0.3,
f2(tv)(U) = sh2(v{1,2}) · 0.2+ sh2(v{2}) · 0.1 =
[
(4− 1)
2
+ 2
2
]
· 0.2+ 0.2 = 0.7.
Obviously, (0.3, 0.7) ∈ C˜t(v)(U).
5. Conclusions
We have defined the fuzzy core of the games with fuzzy coalition. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core has been
given. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, games with fuzzy coalitions have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley
value is contained in the fuzzy core when the fuzzy core is nonempty. Due to the three main kinds of games with fuzzy
coalitions, we build the relationship between the core of the crisp game and the fuzzy core. This property will help us have
a better understanding of the fuzzy core and avoid the complicated computation process.
However, we mainly study three kinds of fuzzy cores for games with fuzzy coalitions, and it will be interesting to find
the fuzzy cores for other types of fuzzy games.
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